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Abstract
This paper studies competition between rms when consumers observe a pri-
vate signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures
which allow pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures which are
optimal for rms and those which are optimal for consumers. The rm-optimal
signal structure amplies the underlying product di¤erentiation, thereby relax-
ing competition, while ensuring that consumers purchase their preferred product,
thereby maximizing total welfare. The consumer-optimal structure dampens dif-
ferentiation, which intensies competition, but induces some consumers with weak
preferences between products to buy their less-preferred product. The analysis
sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by con-
sumers can be designed exibly.
Keywords: Information design, Bertrand competition, product di¤erentiation,
online platforms.
1 Introduction
Information ows between rms and consumers a¤ect rm competition and market per-
formance. Information travels in both directions between the two sides of the market.
Firms are able to obtain information about consumer preferences from data brokers,
social media, past interaction with customers, and so on. This enables them (if per-
mitted) to make personalized o¤ers and price discriminate in a targeted manner. On
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the other side, consumers have several ways to gather information about the products
they might buy, and they often rely on online platforms such as search engines and
product comparison websites to obtain information about their likely preferences over
the various products. The precision of their information about products a¤ects both
the quality of the consumer-product match and the intensity of competition between
rms. In this paper we study the second of these information ows.
In more detail, we study a symmetric duopoly market where two rms each costlessly
supply a single variety of a product and compete in prices in one-shot Bertrand fashion.
A consumer is initially uncertain about her preferences for the varieties, but before
purchase she receives a private signal of these preferences. For example, she might
be informed which product she will prefer (but not the precise valuation of either
product), so that the products are ranked. The consumer then updates her beliefs
about her preferences and makes her choice given the pair of prices o¤ered by rms. The
signal structure, which governs the relationship between the consumers true preferences
and the signal she receives, is common knowledge. We wish to understand how the
signal structure a¤ects competition and welfare. In particular, we explore the limits to
competition in this market: which signals induce the highest prot for rms and which
generate the highest surplus for consumers?
One interpretation of the model is that consumers gather information and make pur-
chases via a platform which provides them with product information. The platform can
choose several aspects of its information disclosure to consumers, such as how detailed
is the product information it displays, whether to post customer reviews or its own
reviews, whether to o¤er personalized recommendations, and how exibly consumers
can lter and compare products. Some platforms choose to reveal little information
about products, as when for instance they o¤er consumers a list of hotels of specied
type for a given price, but the consumer only discovers which hotel she will be allocated
once she has paid. Given this exibility over the information released to consumers,
we impose few restrictions on the signal structure. Whether a platform operates to
maximize rm prot, consumer surplus, or total welfare will depend partly on which
sides of the market it can levy fees, which in turn will depend on the relative intensity
of platform competition across the two sides of the market (which is something we do
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not consider in this paper).1
Section 2 introduces the model, and in section 3 we show that the rank signal
allows rms to obtain rst-best prot whenever preferences are su¢ciently dispersed ex
ante. That is, the rank signal enables consumers to buy their preferred product, which
maximizes total welfare, and with dispersed preferences it is an equilibrium for rms to
charge consumers their (expected) valuation of the preferred product. Except for the
trivial case where products are perfect substitutes ex ante, though, it is not possible
for consumers to obtain rst-best surplus. Information which enables consumers to
buy their preferred product also gives market power to rms and induces prices above
marginal cost, and consumers face a trade-o¤ between low prices and the ability to buy
the better product.
Beyond situations where rst-best prot is feasible, attempts to derive an optimal
second-best signal structure encounter two problems. First, consumer preferences are
generally two-dimensional, and current understanding of optimal information design in
such cases is limited. For that reason, from section 4 onwards we nd ways to simplify
the model so that relevant consumer heterogeneity is scalar. Second, even with scalar
heterogeneity some posterior distributions are such that the only equilibria in the pricing
game between rms involve mixed strategies, which can be hard to characterize. For
this reason, until section 6 we focus on signal structures which induce a pure strategy
equilibrium in the pricing game.
In section 4 we simplify the model so that the outside option for consumers is not
relevant for the analysis. (In essence this requires that valuations be su¢ciently con-
centrated ex ante.) This implies that only the di¤erence in valuations for the two
productsa scalar variablematters for consumer decisions. Our approach is to nd
which signal structures (if any) can support given prices as equilibrium prices. It turns
out that a price pair can be supported in equilibrium if the posterior preference distri-
bution induced by the signal structure lies between two bounds. Posterior distributions
which correspond to the upper bound are relevant for the consumer-optimal policy,
while the lower bound is what determines the rm-optimal policy. In section 4.2 we re-
1An alternative interpretation is that consumers can commit to how much product information
to acquire before rms make their pricing decisions. For instance, a consumer could strategically
delegate her purchase decision to an agent who commits to focus more on price than other product
characteristics in order to stimulate price competition among suppliers.
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strict attention to symmetric signals which induce the two rms to o¤er the same price
in equilibrium, and in section 4.3 we demonstrate that in regular cases neither rms
nor consumers can do better if asymmetric signals and prices are implemented. (Sur-
prisingly, asymmetric signals which favour one rm cannot improve that rms prot
relative to the rm-optimal symmetric policy.)
The rm-optimal signal structure amplies perceived product di¤erentiation in
order to relax competition, and does so by reducing the likelihood that consumers ex
post are near-indi¤erent between products. (The rank signal which sometimes yields
rst-best prot is an extreme instance of this.) In regular cases, the rm-optimal
policy allows consumers to buy their preferred product for sure, in which case total
welfare is also maximized. The consumer-optimal signal structure by contrast dampens
product di¤erentiation in order to stimulate competition, and does so by increasing
the number of consumers who are near-indi¤erent between products. In the consumer-
optimal policy, a consumer with strong preferences can buy her preferred product for
sure, but a less choosy consumer receives less precise information and may end up with
the inferior product. In contrast to the rm-optimal policy, product mismatch means
that the consumer-optimal policy does not maximize total welfare.
In section 4 the outside option was not relevant for consumers, and so the constraint
on a rm raising its price was that the consumer would buy from its rival. By contrast,
when the rst-best prot was feasible in section 3 the constraint on raising price was
that the consumer would exit the market. We bridge the gap between these extreme
situations in section 5 using a framework with scalar consumer heterogeneity in which
both constraints play a role. Since the consumer-optimal policy induces low prices in
the market, the presence of an outside option has relatively little impact on the design
of that policy. However, the high prices typically seen with the rm-optimal policy are
often constrained by the outside option, and the optimal policy then induces a posterior
distribution such that no consumers regard products as close substitutes.
Section 6 discusses whether considering the wider class of signals which allow mixed-
strategy pricing equilibria can improve outcomes. By modifying the bounds approach
we used with pure pricing strategies, we show that allowing mixed-strategy equilibria
could at best improve consumer surplus only slightly. We conclude with some comments
about how this analysis could usefully be extended in future work.
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Related literature. One strand of the relevant literature considers a monopolists
incentive to provide product information to enable consumers to discover their valuation
for its product. An early paper on this topic is Lewis and Sappington (1994). They
study a monopoly market and show that, within the class of truth or noise signal
structures, it is optimal for the rm either to disclose no information or all information.
Johnson and Myatt (2006) derive a similar result for a more general class of information
structures which induce rotations of the demand curve. Anderson and Renault (2006)
argue that partial information disclosure before consumers search can be optimal for a
monopolist if consumers need to pay a search cost to buy the product (in which case
they learn their valuation automatically). Importantly, they allow for exible signal
structures as in the later Bayesian persuasion literature and show that rm-optimal
information disclosure takes the coarse form whereby a consumer is informed merely
whether her valuation lies above a threshold.
Roesler and Szentes (2017) study the signal structure which is best for consumers
(rather than the rm) in a monopoly model. They show that the optimal signal struc-
ture can be found within the class of posterior distributions which induce unit-elastic
demand functions. (These unit-elastic demand functions play a similar role as the
bounds in our analysis.) They show that partial rather than complete learning is opti-
mal for consumers, and that the optimal information structure induces ex ante e¢cient
trade and maximizes total welfare.2 In their setup, where trade is always e¢cient,
the rm-optimal signal structure is to disclose no information at all, in which case the
rm can extract all surplus by charging a price equal to the expected valuation. With
competition, however, this is no longer true since without any information consumers
regard the rms products as perfect substitutes and rms earn zero prot. (Indeed in
our duopoly model we will show that disclosing no information is nearly optimal for
consumers, rather than rms.) Therefore, the rm-oriented problem is more interesting
and challenging in our setting with competition than it is with monopoly. With compe-
2Condorelli and Szentes (2018) study the related problem of how to choose the demand curve
to maximize consumer surplus, given the monopolist chooses its price optimally in response. (The
consumer accurately observes her realized valuation in this model.) Choi, Kim, and Pease (2019)
extend Roesler and Szentes (2017) to the set-up of Anderson and Renault (2006), and derive the
consumer-optimal policy in the context of a search good.
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tition, the consumer-optimal policy also exhibits some signicant di¤erences with the
monopoly case in Roesler and Szentes. For example, it usually causes product mis-
match so that the allocation is not e¢cient, the induced residual demand for each rm
is unit-elastic for upward but not downward price deviations, and the consumer-optimal
signal structure is no longer the least protable policy for rms.
Our paper concerns information design in an oligopoly setting. Most of the previous
research on this topic studies the decentralized disclosure policies of individual rms.
For example, Ivanov (2013) studies disclosure in a random-utility model where each
rm decides how much information about its own product to release and what price to
charge. He focuses on information structures which rotate demand as in Johnson and
Myatt (2006), and shows that full disclosure is the only symmetric equilibrium when
there are many rms.3 Hwang, Kim, and Boleslavsky (2019) show that the same result
holds if general signal structures are allowed (and more generally are able to show
that increasing the number of rms induces each rm to reveal more information).
Intuitively, with many rms, a consumers valuation for the best rival product (if other
rms fully disclose their information) is high. To compete for the consumer, a rm
discloses all information as that is the policy which maximizes the posterior probability
she has a high valuation.4
Instead of studying equilibrium disclosure by individual rms, though, we focus on
a centralized design problem (e.g., where a platform mediates the information ow
from products to consumers), which allows us to discuss signals which reect relative
valuations across products (e.g., which rank the products). This more general signal
structure introduces a number of additional features. In our framework, for instance,
full information disclosure is not the rm-optimal design even with many rms, and
the rank policy sometimes yields rst-best prot for rms (which can never be achieved
with a decentralized design). In addition, when decentralized signals are not fully
revealing there are welfare losses since consumers sometimes choose a less preferred
product, while with a centralized structure it is possible to have a coarse signal structure
3Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2012) study competitive product design, which can also be inter-
preted as information design, within a sequential search market. They consider designs which rotate
demand, and show that a reduction in the search cost induces more rms to choose niche product
design (i.e., full information disclosure).
4A similar result appears in other recent works which study competitive disclosure but without
price competition, such as Board and Lu (2018).
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(e.g., the rank signal) which maintains e¢ciency. Finally, Hwang et al. (2019) show
that the equilibrium price (and hence prot) often falls relative to the full-information
price when individual rms choose their disclosure policy, while by construction the
centralized rm-optimal policy must boost prot.
Other papers have also studied centralized aspects of the design of consumer
information. Anderson and Renault (2009) study comparative advertising in a duopoly
model where each rm unilaterally chooses between fully disclosing its own product
information, fully disclosing information about both products, or disclosing nothing.
Among other results, they make the point that disclosing more information improves
match quality but also softens price competition. (Jullien and Pavan (2019) make
a similar point in a model of two-sided markets.) Dogan and Hu (2019) study the
consumer-optimal disclosure policy in a sequential search framework with many rms.
Consumers receive a signal of their valuation for a particular product only when they
visit its seller. Because the reservation value in this search framework is static, their
problem is related to the monopoly problem with a deterministic outside option studied
by Roesler and Szentes (2017). Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) study a duopoly model
of price competition similar to ours, where the consumer receives a signal of her relative
valuation for the two products. A major di¤erence, however, is that they assume both
the relative valuation and the signal are binary variables, in which case the pricing
equilibrium often involves mixed strategies.
More broadly, our paper belongs to the recent literature on Bayesian persuasion and
information design. See Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for a pioneering paper in this
literature, and Bergemann and Morris (2019) and Kamenica (2019) for recent surveys.
Among its many applications, its method and insights have been used to revisit classic
problems within Industrial Organization. For instance, Bergemann, Brooks, and Mor-
ris (2015) study third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist. (In contrast to our
model, their paper considers signals sent to the rm about consumer preferences, and
consumers accurately know their valuation from the start. A given signal structure cor-
responds to a particular partition of consumers.) If all ways to partition consumers are
possible, the paper shows that any combination of prot (above the no-discrimination
benchmark) and consumer surplus which sum to no more than maximum welfare can
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be implemented by means of some partition of consumers.5
2 The model
A risk-neutral consumer wishes to buy a single unit of a di¤erentiated product costlessly
supplied by two risk-neutral rms, 1 and 2. The consumers valuation for the unit from
rm i = 1; 2 is denoted vi  0, and her outside option is sure to have payo¤ zero. If pi
is rm is price, the consumer wishes to buy from rm i if vi   pi  maxfvj   pj; 0g,
so that she prefers the net surplus from rm i to that available from rm j or from the
outside option. (She wishes to consume the outside option if v1 < p1 and v2 < p2.)
The consumer is initially uncertain about her valuations and holds some prior belief
about the distribution of (v1; v2). Throughout the paper we assume that rms are
symmetric ex ante, in the sense that the prior distribution for consumer preferences
v = (v1; v2) is symmetric between v1 and v2. We assume that the support of v lies
inside the square [V; V + ]2. Here, V  0 represents the basic utility from any
product, while   0 captures the extra utility a consumer might obtain from the ideal
product. (If  is small then the products are nearly perfect substitutes.) Let  = E[vi]
denote the expected valuation of either product, and write
H = E[ maxfv1; v2g] ; L = E[ minfv1; v2g] : (1)
Thus H denotes the expected valuation of the preferred product, while L is the
expected valuation of the less preferred product. (They are related by L + H = 2.)
Finally, write
 = H    = E[ maxfv1   v2; 0g] (2)
for the incremental expected surplus from choosing the consumers preferred product
rather than a random product.
5There are various papers which extend Bergemann et al. to di¤erent settings. For instance,
Elliot and Galeotti (2019) consider a duopoly version of Bergemann et al. and assume each rm has
some captive consumers who buy only from the rm they know. They show that if each rm has
enough captive consumers, information design can earn rms the rst-best prot. Ali, Lewis, and
Vasserman (2019) depart from the information design approach in Bergemann et al. by considering
a disclosure game with veriable information where consumers choose how much information about
their preferences they disclose to rms. They show that consumer control of their information tends
to improve their welfare relative to full or no information disclosure.
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We study situations where before purchase the consumer observes a private signal
of her preferences rather than the preferences themselves. The signal is generated
according to a signal structure f(sjv); Sg, where S is a (su¢ciently rich) signal space
and (sjv) species the distribution of signal s when the true preference parameter
is v. We assume the signal structure is common knowledge to the consumer and to
both rms, and determined before rms choose prices.6 After observing a signal s, the
consumer updates her beliefs about her preferences v. Risk neutrality implies that only
the expected v given s matters for the consumers choice. The prior distribution for v
and the signal structure jointly determine a new posterior distribution for (expected) v
for the consumer. Since rms do not observe the consumers private signal, they each
choose a single price regardless of the signal received, and only the posterior distribution
for v matters for their pricing decisions. Firms set prices simultaneously, and we use
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept of the pricing game. Note that prices
are accurately observed by the consumer in all cases, so that uncertainty concerns only
the consumers preferences.
To illustrate, consider these simple signal structures:
 Full information disclosure: here the signal perfectly reveals the true preferences,
e.g., where s  v, and so the posterior and prior distributions for v coincide.
 No information disclosure: here the signal is completely uninformative (i.e., the
distribution of s does not depend on v) and the posterior distribution is a single
point, v = (; ). In particular, the consumer views the two products as perfect
substitutes and will choose to buy from the rm with the lower price (if that price
is no higher than ).
 Rank signal structure: here the signal informs the consumer which product she
prefers but nothing else, so that s 2 fs1; s2g and she observes s = s1 if v1 > v2 and
s = s2 if v2 > v1. (She sees each signal with equal probability in the knife-edge
6In the platform context, a platform might know a consumers preferences (e.g., due to its past
interactions with the consumer or using information from data brokers) and sends the consumer a
signal contingent on those preferences. A less informationally demanding situation is that the platform
does not know idiosyncratic preferences, but consumers with di¤erent preferences use the platforms
information in di¤erent ways. For example, if some consumers care more about attribute A while
others care more about attribute B, and if the platform reveals more information about attribute A,
then the rst group of consumers will learn more about their true valuations than the other group.
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case v1 = v2.) In this case, the posterior distribution divides consumers into two
groups: all consumers who see s1 have expected valuation H for product 1 and
L for product 2, while consumers who see s2 have the reverse valuations.
In all these cases the signal structure is symmetric in the sense that rms are treated
equally, but we also allow for asymmetric signal structures in which one rm is sys-
tematically favored. For example, the consumer might be informed whether or not v1
exceeds v2 by a specied margin.
We aim to investigate how the signal structure a¤ects competition and the ability
of consumers to buy their preferred product. In particular, we search for those signal
structures which maximize industry prot and those which maximize consumer surplus.
At a general level this appears to be an intractable problem, and in the following analysis
we study special cases of this framework which are tractable. In the next section we
discuss the easiest case to analyze, which is when the rst-best prot can be achieved.
3 First-best outcomes
Suppose we nd a signal structure which (i) maximizes total surplus (prot plus con-
sumer surplus) and (ii) allocates all of that surplus to the rms in equilibrium. Then
clearly no other signal structure can do better for rms (or do worse for consumers). If
such a signal structure exists, its form is straightforward to derive. Since total surplus is
maximized the consumer must always buy her preferred product, and since her surplus
is fully extracted, she must only learn her expected valuation of the preferred product
and pay a price equal to that valuation, i.e., p1 = p2 = H . For this to constitute an
equilibrium, however, a rm cannot obtain more prot by deviating to a low enough
price to attract those consumers who prefer the rival product, which requires deviating
to price p = L, and thereby serving all consumers. Thus, if
1
2
H  L the rank signal
structure has equilibrium prices p1 = p2 = H and fully extracts maximum surplus for
rms.7 This discussion is formally stated in the following result.
7If instead of duopoly the two products were jointly supplied by a multiproduct monopolist, the
rank signal structure with associated prices p1 = p2 = H allows the rm to fully extract surplus, and
so is always the most protable signal structure for the rm, regardless of whether (3) holds.
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Proposition 1 If
H  2L (3)
then the rank signal structure leads to an equilibrium which fully extracts maximum
surplus for rms, and is therefore the signal structure which maximizes industry prot.
Since L  V and H  V +, condition (3) requires   V , so that the range of
valuations is large relative to the basic utility. Using (2), condition (3) can be written
equivalently as
3   ; (4)
so that for a given mean  rst-best prot is more likely to be feasible when the di¤erence
v1  v2 is more dispersed. There are at least two ways in which the valuation di¤erence
might be made more dispersed. First, for a given marginal distribution for vi if the
joint distribution becomes less positively correlated then  rises.8 Second, if the two
valuations are independently distributed, then one can show that a mean-preserving
spread in this distribution implies that  rises.
If v is uniformly distributed on the square [0;]2 then H =
2
3
 and L =
1
3

and so (3) is (just) satised. More generally, the following result shows that (3) holds
when the density is weakly decreasing on [0;]. (All omitted proofs can be found in
the appendix.)
Corollary 1 Suppose that v1 and v2 are independently distributed with density which
weakly decreases over the support [0;]. Then condition (3) is satised and the rank
signal structure generates rst-best prot.
One can also consider whether there exists a signal structure which maximizes total
surplus and allocates it all to consumers in equilibrium. This would require that p1 =
p2 = 0 are equilibrium prices, which in turn requires that consumers regard the two
products as perfect substitutes. Except in the trivial case where the underlying products
are perfect substitutes, i.e., when the prior distribution has v1  v2, if a signal structure
8More precisely, let F (v1; v2) and F^ (v1; v2) denote two joint CDFs for valuations with the same
marginal distribution for vi (and hence with the same mean ), such that F is more correlated than
F^ in the sense of Epstein and Tanny (1980), i.e., that F  F^ . Since the function maxfv1   v2; 0g is
correlation averse as dened in Epstein and Tanny, its expectation  is higher with F^ than with F ,
and so if rst-best prot is feasible with F it is also feasible with the less correlated distribution F^ .
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induces consumers to view the products as identical, they are unable to choose the
preferred product more than half the time. Therefore, there is a trade o¤ for consumers
between paying low prices and being able to buy their preferred product, and thus no
signal structure can implement the rst-best outcome for consumers.
In this section we have derived the rm-optimal signal structurewhich is the rank
signal structurewhen valuations are su¢ciently dispersed that (3) holds. In this case,
rms fully extract consumer surplus and the constraint that consumers not wish to
consume their outside option always binds. In the remainder of the paper we discuss
optimal signal structures when the rst-best is not feasible, which is a considerably
harder problem. In the next section we examine the next simplest case, which is when
valuations are su¢ciently concentrated, in which case we can ignore the consumer
participation constraint altogether.
4 The market without an outside option
As discussed in the introduction, when rst-best prot is not achievable (i.e., when
(3) does not hold) attempts to derive an optimal second-best signal structure face two
problems. First, preferences v = (v1; v2) are generally two-dimensional, and current
understanding of optimal information design in such cases is limited.9 For that reason,
in the remainder of the paper we simplify the model so that relevant consumer informa-
tion is only scalar. Second, even with scalar heterogeneity some posterior distributions
are such that the only equilibria in the pricing game between rms involve complicated
mixed strategies.10 For this reason, until section 6 we focus on signal structures which
induce a pure strategy equilibrium in the pricing game.
9It is well known that the posterior (expected) consumer valuation distribution induced by any
information structure is a mean-preserving contraction of the underlying prior distribution. However,
unlike the scalar case, a mean-preserving contraction has no simple characterization when consumer
heterogeneity is multidimensional. See section 7.2 of Dworczak and Martini (2019) for discussion of
this point.
10For example, when the rst-best prot is not feasible, the rank signal structure induces a binary
posterior distribution for valuations with which there is no pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium. For
particular distributions with several mass points, it can be di¢cult even to verify whether there exists
a mixed strategy equilibrium.
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4.1 Preliminaries
Throughout section 4 we suppose that consumer preferences are such that the outside
option is never relevant for consumers. The advantage of this assumption is that only
the di¤erence in valuations, x  v1   v2, matters for consumer decisions and welfare,
and so the relevant consumer heterogeneity is captured by this scalar variable. The
following result provides a su¢cient condition for the outside option to be irrelevant,
which is that valuations have a concentrated distribution in the sense that the range
of valuations is small relative to the minimum valuation. (Note that we allow signal
structures which make the posterior market asymmetric.)
Lemma 1 If V > 3, then under any signal structure which induces a pure strategy
equilibrium, equilibrium prices are below V and all consumers obtain positive surplus
from both rms.
Proof. With any signal structure the maximum posterior valuation for a product
does not exceed V + and the minimum posterior valuation is at least V . Suppose a
signal structure induces rms i = 1; 2 to o¤er respective prices p1 and p2 and to obtain
prots 1 and 2. It is clear that neither p1 nor p2 can exceed V + .
11 Firm j will
serve all consumers if it deviates to a low price p such that V   p  V +  pi, i.e., if
p  pi . (Since pi  V + the inequality V  p  V + pi ensures that V  p  0
so that all consumers prefer to buy from rm j than to buy nothing.) Therefore, we
must have
pi    j : (5)
If rms are labelled so p1  p2, then the above inequality implies p1    2  p2 so
that the price di¤erence p1   p2 cannot exceed . Adding the pair of inequalities (5)
implies that
p1 + p2   2  1 + 2  p1 ;
11If rm j did choose price pj > V + in equilibrium, then no consumer will buy from it, and rm
i acts as a monopolist and its optimal price must be pi  V > 0. Then rm j can earn a strictly
positive prot by deviating to a price slightly below pi, as under any signal structure there must be a
positive measure of consumers who weakly prefer product j over product i given the two products are
symmetric ex ante.
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where the second inequality follows since industry prot cannot exceed the maximum
price p1, and so p2  2. Since p1   p2   it follows that p1  3, and so when
3 < V we must have maxfp1; p2g < V .
Note that in the case of a symmetric equilibrium, the proof shows that p1 = p2  2, so
that feasible symmetric prices lie in the interval [0; 2]. Note also that in the consumer-
optimal policy we derive below the induced prices are su¢ciently low that the condition
V > 3 can be considerably weakened.
For the remainder of section 4 suppose that both prices in any pure strategy equi-
librium are less than V , so that the outside option is irrelevant in the sense that if at
most one rm deviates from equilibrium all consumers continue to participate. The
consumer prefers to buy from rm 1 if x  v1  v2 > p1  p2, prefers to buy from rm 2
if x < p1   p2 (and is indi¤erent when x = p1   p2). Since in the underlying market v1
and v2 are symmetrically distributed, the scalar variable x is symmetrically distributed
within the line segment [ ;], with a CDF denoted by F (x) say. Then  in (2) takes
the form
 = E[ maxfv1   v2; 0g] =
Z 
0
xdF (x) =
Z 0
 
F (x)dx (6)
where the nal expression follows after integration by parts (which remains valid even
if F is not continuous) and uses the fact that x has a zero mean (which impliesR 
 
F (x)dx = ). Clearly   1
2
 for any symmetric F , while   1
4
 if F is
convex in the range [ ; 0] and has no mass point at x =  .
Clearly, any signal of the two-dimensional preference parameter v in section 2 in-
duces a signal s of the scalar preference parameter x (while any additional information
in the signal plays no role for consumers or welfare). After observing signal s, the
consumer updates her belief about her expected x. The prior distribution F and the
signal structure jointly determine a signal distribution for the consumer, which further
determines a posterior distribution for (expected) x which has CDF G(x), say. For a
given prior F , the only restriction on the posterior G imposed by Bayesian consistency
is that it is a mean-preserving contraction (MPC) of F , i.e.,Z x
 
G(~x)d~x 
Z x
 
F (~x)d~x for x 2 [ ;], with equality at x =  : (7)
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Moreover, any G which is an MPC of F can be generated by some signal structure
(which can be based simply on the scalar preference parameter x instead of (v1; v2)).
12
Therefore, instead of analyzing the signal structure directly (as we did with the rst-
best analysis), we work with the posterior distribution G subject only to the MPC
constraint.
To x ideas, Figure 1 depicts various kinds of posterior distributions for x which are
an MPC of the prior distribution (marked as dashed lines), here taken to be a uniform
distribution on [ 1; 1]. When G crosses F once and from below on ( ;), as in
Figures 1a and 1c, then the necessary condition that G has the same mean as F , i.e.,
that there is equality at x =  in (7), is also su¢cient for G to be an MPC of F .
If G is symmetric and crosses F at most once and from below in the negative range
x 2 ( ; 0), as on Figures 1a and 1b, then the necessary condition
Z 0
 
G(x)dx 
Z 0
 
F (x)dx   (8)
is su¢cient for G to be an MPC of F .
density CDF
-1 0 1
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1 0 1
0.0
0.5
1.0
Figure 1a: MPC which increases density of consumers at x = 0
12See, for example, Blackwell (1953), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016),
and Roesler and Szentes (2017).
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Figure 1b: MPC which reduces density of consumers at x = 0
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Figure 1c: Asymmetric MPC which shifts demand to one rm
It is useful to have a measure of the e¢ciency of product choice with a given sig-
nal structure corresponding to posterior G. With symmetric prices and full consumer
participation, total surplus is the expected value of maxfv1; v2g given G, which can be
written as
WG = EG[maxfv1; v2g] = + EG[maxfv1   v2; 0g] = +
Z 0
 
G(x)dx ; (9)
where the nal equality follows with similar logic to (6). Since G is an MPC of F , the
necessary condition (8) shows that match e¢ciency cannot increase when the consumer
observes a noisy signal of her preferences rather than her actual preferences, as is
intuitive. When the equality (8) is strictas in Figures 1a and 1c but not Figure 1b
then there is mismatch with the posterior G, due to the consumer sometimes buying
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the wrong product. In the extreme case where the signal is completely uninformative,
we have G = 0 for x < 0 and WG = , the expected surplus from consuming a random
product. There is no product mismatch when there is equality in (8). In terms of
the signal structure this is the case when the range of signals seen when x > 0 does
not overlap with the range of signals seen when x < 0, so that the consumer is fully
informed about whether x > 0 or x < 0, even though she may not be fully informed
about the magnitude of x.
Some of the most frequently-used signal structures induce consumers to become
more concentrated around x = 0, similarly to Figure 1a. This is so with a truth-
or-noise structure, whereby the signal s is equal to the true x with some probability
and otherwise the signal is a random realization of x, or more generally when the
distribution for x is rotated about x = 0 as studied by Johnson and Myatt (2006).
Such signals induce a degree of mismatch. By contrast, a signal which accurately
reveals to a consumer which product she prefers (so that (8) holds with equality) will
necessarily induce weakly fewer consumers around x = 0 ex post, as on Figure 1b.13
A leading case, which simplies the following analysis and ensures all our major
results, is when the prior distribution for x has a (symmetric) density which is log-
concave on [ ;].14 In this case, as shown by Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), both
F () and 1   F () are log-concave on [ ;], and in addition the underlying market
(where consumers are fully informed about valuations) has a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium where the equilibrium price is pF = 1=(2f(0)). A useful observation for
later is the following:
Lemma 2 If the prior density f(x) is log-concave on [ ;], then the full-information
price pF = 1=(2f(0)) satises
2  pF  4 : (10)
Since  in (6) measures the extent of product di¤erentiation when consumers are fully
informed, this result shows that the corresponding price moves roughly in step with
this product di¤erentiation.
13This is because when (8) binds, the MPC constraint (7) requires that G lie weakly above F for x
just below zero, in which case G is weakly atter than F at x = 0.
14For example, if (v1; v2) have a log-concave joint density (which includes the case when v1 and v2
are i.i.d. with a log-concave density), their di¤erence x also has a log-concave density.
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Before the general analysis, we rst compare the performance of several simple
signal structures, related to the signal structures mentioned in section 2, when the
prior density for x is log-concave:
 Full information disclosure: in this case industry prot is pF , and consumer sur-
plus is  +    pF     , where the inequality follows from (10). Consumers
always buy their preferred product but the market price is relatively high.
 No information disclosure: in this case the two products are perceived to be
perfect substitutes. Equilibrium price and industry prot are zero, while consumer
surplus is  which is higher than with full information disclosure. No information
leads to a random product match but also the lowest possible price, and the
benet of the low price dominates.
 Truth or rank signal structure: suppose the consumer learns her x perfectly
with probability  < 1 and otherwise learns only whether x > 0 or x < 0. Then
the posterior distribution has two mass points at  2 and 2 (with mass 1 
2
at
each) and is otherwise the same as the prior but with a reduced density f(x).
In this case, if  is su¢ciently close to 1 (so the two mass points do not have
too much weight), a symmetric equilibrium price exists and is equal to pF

> pF ,
and so rms earn more than they did with full disclosure.15 (Consumer surplus,
however, is lower than with full disclosure because in either case the consumer
buys the product she prefers.)
These ad hoc signals illustrate that with a regular prior full information disclosure
is optimal neither for rms nor consumers. In the next section we derive the signal
structures which are optimal for rms and for consumers.
4.2 Optimal symmetric signal structures
In this section, we focus on the relatively simple case of symmetric signal structures,
where the posterior distribution G is symmetric, and study which symmetric prices
15For example, when the prior distribution is uniform on [ 1; 1], one can check, by using the posterior
bounds derived in section 4.2, this is the case for   3   p5  0:76. If  is below this threshold,
the incentive for each rm to undercut and steal the rivals consumers on the mass points becomes so
strong that there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
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can be implemented and which symmetric signal structures are best for rms and for
consumers.16 When the underlying market has a log-concave density, we will show
in section 4.3 that no individual rm nor consumers in aggregate can do better using
asymmetric signals and prices.
Having discussed the constraints on G imposed by Bayesian consistency in section
4.1, we turn next to the constraints on G needed to achieve a target symmetric price
in pure strategy equilibrium. For p = 0 to be an equilibrium price, the consumer must
regard the two varieties as identical, and this can happen only if G is degenerate at
x = 0. In the following, we focus on positive prices. First note that to have a positive
symmetric equilibrium price the distribution G cannot have an atom at x = 0, i.e.,
we must have G(0) = 1
2
, for otherwise a rm obtains a discrete jump in demand if it
slightly undercuts its rival. Recall also that any symmetric equilibrium price satises
p  2.
Consider a candidate symmetric equilibrium price p > 0. If rm 2 deviates to price
p0 6= p the consumer buys from rm 2 if x  p  p0. (Thus we suppose that if G has a
mass point at x = p   p0, rm 2 serves all consumers at that mass point. This is the
natural tie-breaking rule given that the rm can achieve this outcome by charging a
price slightly below p0.) Therefore, rm 2 has no incentive to deviate if and only if
p0G(p  p0)  1
2
p
holds for all p0. (The inequality holds with equality at p0 = p since G(0) = 1
2
.) By
changing variables from p0 to x = p  p0, we can write this requirement as
G(x)  Up(x)  min

1;
p
2maxf0; p  xg

: (11)
(It is unprotable for rm 2 to set a negative price p0, and so there are restrictions
on G only in the range where p0 = p   x > 0, which is why there is maxf0; g in the
denominator. In addition, a CDF cannot exceed 1 which is why there is minf1; g in
(11).) Likewise, for rm 1 to have no incentive to deviate we require p0(1   G(p0  
p))  1
2
p for all (positive) p0.17 Following the parallel argument to that for rm 2, this
16In section 4.3 we show that equilibrium prices induced by a symmetric posterior G, or any G such
that G(0) = 1=2, must be symmetric.
17As with rm 2, if x has an atom at x = p0   p the natural tie-breaking assumption is that rm 1
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constraint can be written as
G(x)  Lp(x)  max

0; 1  p
2maxf0; p+ xg

: (12)
This analysis shows that p 2 (0; 2] can be supported as an equilibrium price by G
if and only if G lies between the two bounds Lp and Up. (This bounds condition also
ensures G(0) = 1
2
as shown below.) Notice also that the two bounds are mirror images
of each other, in the sense that Lp(x)  1   Up( x). Therefore, if a symmetric G lies
between the bounds in the negative range x 2 [ ; 0] it will lie between the bounds
over the whole range [ ;].
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(a) p = 0:5
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x
(b) p = 1:5
Figure 2: Bounds on G to implement prices p = 0:5 and p = 1:5
Figure 2 illustrates the two bounds (depicted as bold curves) for target prices p = 0:5
and p = 1:5. The lower bound Lp is increasing in x and begins to be positive at x =  12p
which exceeds   given p  2. Moreover, Lp is concave whenever Lp is positive. The
upper bound Up is increasing in x and reaches 1 at x =
1
2
p  , and it is convex when
below 1. These two bounds coincide and equal 1
2
, and have the same slope 1=(2p), when
x = 0. It follows that the lower bound is always below the upper bound, and so the
set of Gs lying between the bounds Lp and Up is non-empty for 0 < p  2. Note
also that both Lp and Up rotate clockwise about the point (0;
1
2
) as p increases, and in
serves all customers at x. Strictly speaking, as a CDF is right-continuous, here we need to interpret
1   G(p0   p) as including any atom at p0   p. Since the bounds we derive are continuous functions,
this point makes no di¤erence to the analysis.
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particular the bounds increase with p for negative x. (Intuitively, to induce a higher
price we need fewer consumers around x = 0, which requires the bounds to be atter.)
Another observation used in the subsequent analysis is that Up is log-convex in x when
it is below 1, and 1  Lp is log-convex when Lp is positive.18
Recall that a posterior is only feasible if it is an MPC of the prior. Therefore, price
p can be implemented with some signal structure provided a G can be found within
the bounds (11)(12) which is an MPC of the prior. Figure 2 illustrates the case when
the prior is uniform on [ 1; 1], where the prior CDF is marked as the dashed line and
where the full-information price is pF = 1. In either case, if the posterior G is chosen
to be the lower bound for x  0 and the upper bound for x  0, then this G is an
MPC of F and (by construction) lies between the bounds. Therefore, both prices can
be implemented with a suitable signal structure. The latter price is already 50% higher
than the full-information price.
We say that (G; p) is a symmetric outcome if G is a symmetric MPC of F and p is a
symmetric equilibrium price given G. Note that if the posterior G is symmetric about
x = 0 then it automatically has the same mean as F , and the condition for G to be an
MPC of F only requires that (7) hold in the lower range x 2 [ ; 0]. We summarize
this discussion in the following:
Lemma 3 (G; p) is a symmetric outcome if and only if G is a symmetric distribution
such that for x 2 [ ; 0] condition (7) holds and
Lp(x)  G(x)  Up(x) : (13)
In the following we will mainly focus on the case when the prior distribution has a
density f(x) which is log-concave on [ ;], although as we will discuss this analysis
can be generalized to more general prior distributions.
Firm-optimal policy: Using the posterior bounds it is straightforward to derive the
symmetric signal structure which maximizes prot in this market. Since there is full
18This analysis may have some independent interest for studying price competition. For a given
distribution G(x) which is di¤erentiable at x = 0 (which is required by the bounds condition), one can
calculate a potential symmetric equilibrium price p from the usual rst-order condition. If G is veried
to lie between the bounds Lp and Up then p is indeed the equilibrium price. This approach is more
general than the usual approach of checking the quasi-concavity of each rms prot function with G.
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consumer participation, maximizing prot corresponds to nding the maximum price
which can be implemented with an MPC of the prior. Lemma 3 implies that if (G; p)
is a symmetric outcome then so is ( ~G; p), where ~G(x) = Lp(x) for x 2 [ ; 0] and
~G(x) = Up(x) for x 2 [0;]. Therefore, to nd the rm-optimal price we can restrict
attention to symmetric posteriors which take the form Lp for x 2 [ ; 0].
Consider rst the example with a uniform prior, as on Figure 2. Given that Lp is
concave whenever it is positive, it crosses the (linear) prior CDF at most once and from
below in the range of ( 1; 0). Therefore, from (8) a symmetric G which is equal to Lp
for x  0 is an MPC of the prior if and only if Lp has integral on [ 1; 0] no greater
than , where  = 1=4 in this uniform example. Since Lp increases with p for x  0, it
is optimal to make this integral constraint bind, so that the optimal price p solves
1
4
=
Z 0
 1
Lp(x)dx =
Z 0
 
1
2
p

1  p
2(p+ x)

dx = 1
2
(1  log 2)p
and so
p =
1
2(1  log 2)  1:63 :
This optimal price is about 63% higher than the full-information price pF = 1. The
posterior distribution which implements this optimal price is what we depicted on Figure
1b above where the density is U-shaped. Intuitively, to soften price competition we
reduce the number of marginal consumers around x = 0, as these consumers are the
most price sensitive, and push consumers towards the two extremes insofar as this is
feasible given the pure-strategy and the MPC constraints.
This same argument applies more generally whenever the lower bound Lp for each
price crosses the prior CDF F at most once and from below in the range ( ; 0). This
is true, for example, if F is convex in the range [ ; 0]. More generally, since 1   Lp
is log-convex when Lp is positive, this is the case if 1   F is log-concave in the range
[ ; 0].19 (A su¢cient condition for 1   F to be log-concave on [ ; 0] is that it has
a density f which is log-concave on [ ;].) Then the lower bound is an MPC of the
prior if and only if its integral over [ ; 0] is no greater than that of the prior (which
is ). Since the former integral increases in p, at the optimum there is equality in the
19Because log(1  F ) is concave and decreasing on [ ; 0] and log(1  Lp) is (strictly) convex and
decreasing on [ ; 0], the former function can cross the latter at most once in ( ; 0).
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two integrals (unless p reaches 2 rst), so that the prot maximizing price p is
p =
2
1  log 2 : (14)
(This does not exceed 2 when the prior density is log-concave since in that case
  1
4
.) In particular, the rm-optimal price p in (14) is higher when the prior
distribution for x is more dispersed, in the sense that  is larger. The rm-optimal
symmetric G, equal to the lower bound Lp for x < 0, is unique in this case. With
this posterior distribution, when a rm deviates to a price lower than p its demand is
unit-elastic (i.e., its prot is unchanged), although when it deviates to a higher price
its prot strictly falls.
There are also two other useful observations. First, since by construction (8) holds
with equality, the rm-optimal signal structure induces no mismatch, and total welfare
is maximized as well as prot. Second, the rm-optimal price p is considerably higher
than the price pF under full information disclosure, so that full information disclosure is
not optimal for rms. Indeed, with a log-concave density (10) and (14) together imply
that p  1
2(1 log 2)
pF  1:63  pF , and so relative to full disclosure prots rise by at
least 63% using the optimal signal structure.
We summarize this discussion in the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose the outside option is not relevant and the prior distribution
has a log-concave density. Then:
(i) the rm-optimal symmetric price p is (14), which is at least 63% higher than the
full-information price pF , and it is uniquely implemented by the symmetric posterior
which is equal to Lp in the negative range x 2 [ ; 0];
(ii) with the rm-optimal symmetric signal structure there is no mismatch and total
welfare is also maximized.
Note that familiar signal structures such as rotations in the distribution around
x = 0 induce consumers to be more concentrated around x = 0, and so cannot be
used to enhance prot relative to the full-information policy. Therefore, the use of
unrestricted signal structures, which allow consumers to buy their preferred product,
enables rms to do at least 63% better than they could with these more restricted
signals.
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Beyond the simple case with a log-concave density, the rm-optimal price which can
be implemented with some signal structure is the highest p  2 such that Lp in (12)
satises Z x
 
Lp(~x)d~x 
Z x
 
F (~x)d~x for x 2 [ ; 0] :
In general Lp and F can cross multiple times in the range ( ; 0), in which case solving
the optimal price can be less straightforward. Moreover, (8) might hold strictly and so
there could be welfare loss associated with the rm-optimal signal structure. Figure 3
illustrates both points, where the prior shown as the dashed curve is initially convex
and then concave. The highest price such that Lp is an MPC of the prior is shown as
the solid curve, where the integrals of the two curves up to the crossing point a are
equal (so with any higher price the MPC constraint would be violated). Here, since Lp
lies below the prior for x above a, (8) holds strictly and there is some mismatch at the
optimum.
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Figure 3: Firm-optimal posterior with a less regular prior
Consumer-optimal policy: We turn next to the problem of nding the best sym-
metric signal structure for consumers. Unlike rms, consumers do not care solely about
the induced price but also about the reliability of the product match, and consumer
surplus with posterior G and price p is WG  p, where total welfare WG is given in (9).
Note rst that  is the incremental consumer benet from buying the preferred
product rather than a random product, and that in the information structure where
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consumers receive no product information they buy a random product at price zero.
Therefore, for consumers to do better than the no-information policy, the price they
pay cannot exceed . With a log-concave prior density, however, (10) shows that the
full-information price satises pF  2, and so the consumer-optimal price must be
less than half of the full-information price. In addition, maximum consumer surplus
is at least  (which is consumer surplus with no information disclosure), and with a
log-concave density this is at least  more than consumer surplus with full information
disclosure (which is +    pF    ).
To solve the consumer-optimal problem in more detail, we rst nd the highest pos-
sible G to maximize match e¢ciency for a given price p, subject to the bounds condition
(13) and the MPC constraint, and we then identify the optimal price. Consider again
the example where the prior distribution is uniform on [ 1; 1], where the equilibrium
price with full information disclosure is pF = 1. For consumers to do better than this
policy, the induced price must be below 1 to counter-act any potential product mis-
match, in which case the bounds look similar to Figure 2a and the upper bound is below
the prior for x close to zero. (In fact, since this density is log-concave, we know the
optimal price is below 1
2
.) Therefore, it is the upper bound (11) which will constrain G,
rather than the lower bound which was relevant for the rm-optimal policy. Since the
upper bound is convex, for any price p < 1 the upper bound cuts the prior CDF once
and from above. Figure 4 illustrates how to maximize consumer surplus for a given
price p < 1. Figure 4a shows the two bounds in (13) as bold curves, where the upper
bound cuts the prior CDF at xp  p 1 in this example. Given p, we wish to maximize
the integral of G over [ ; 0], subject to lying between these bounds and the MPC
constraint.
Two necessary conditions for G are that it satisfy the MPC constraint (7) at the
intercept point xp, i.e., Z xp
 
G(x)dx 
Z xp
 
F (x)dx ; (15)
and that G lies below the upper bound for all x above the intercept point. Clearly, the
solution involves setting G(x) = Up(x) for x above the intercept point, since the MPC
constraint (7) is surely satised for x  xp if (15) holds for any G  Up. In addition,
it is clear that (15) must bind. However, there are many ways to choose G such that
this constraint binds, all of which yield the same consumer surplus. Figure 4b shows a
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convenient way to do this, which is to set G equal to the prior CDF for x  xp, so that
G(x) = minfF (x); Up(x)g ; (16)
while Figure 4c depicts an alternative way to satisfy the constraint. Since there is a
strict inequality in (8) for any optimal G, there is welfare loss at the consumer optimum
and some consumers buy their less preferred product. However, those consumers with
strong preferences, i.e., those with x  xp, receive their preferred product for sure.20
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Figure 4: Consumer-optimal G for a given price p
Expression (16) implies that maximum consumer surplus for a given price p  1 is
WG   p = +
Z 0
 
minfF (x); Up(x)gdx  p : (17)
The derivative of (17) with respect to p isZ 0
xp
@Up(x)
@p
dx  1 = 1
2

p
p  xp   log
p
p  xp   3

; (18)
where xp is the intercept point of F (x) and Up(x). In the uniform example where
xp = p   1, (18) becomes 12(p   log p   3) which decreases with p in the range [0; 1].
Then the optimal price is p = , where   0:05 is the root of    log  = 3 in the
range [0; 1].
20Note that for price p  1, the posterior (16) is above Lp. This is because at the full information
price pF = 1 we have LpF  F , and so the same is true for any lower price.
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Figure 5 depicts the consumer-optimal posterior distribution (when it takes the
particular form in Figure 4b), where the number of price-sensitive consumers near
x = 0 is amplied compared with the prior distribution, and this forces rms to reduce
their price in equilibrium. Those consumers near x = 0 do not have strong preferences
about which product they buy, and so there is only limited welfare loss due to product
mismatch. Those consumers with very strong preferences, however, are sure to buy
their preferred product and at a low price. Such a posterior distribution also implies
that when a rm unilaterally increases its price its residual demand is unit-elastic.
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Figure 5: Consumer-optimal information structure
The same argument applies more generally whenever the upper bound for each price
below the full-information price crosses the prior CDF once and from the above in the
range [ ; 0]. A su¢cient condition for that is that the prior density is log-concave.
Proposition 3 Suppose the outside option is not relevant and the prior distribution
has a log-concave density. Then:
(i) the consumer-optimal symmetric price is
p =
 
1  F
 1(1
2
) ; (19)
which satises pF  p  12pF , and it is implemented by the posterior (16);
(ii) with the consumer-optimal symmetric signal structure, only a fraction  of con-
sumers are sure to buy their preferred product, so there is mismatch and total welfare
is not maximized.
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Because the optimal price is often low, the constraint that G should lie below the
upper bound Up is more important than the constraint that G is an MPC of F . It
follows that this consumer-optimal policy is often approximated by the solution to a
simpler problem, which is to choose a symmetric distribution G in order to maximize
equilibrium consumer surplus. In this alternative scenario, there is no prior and no MPC
constraint (or the prior is su¢ciently dispersed such that the MPC constraint does not
bind). In this relaxed problem we wish to choose the distribution for x, say within
the support [ ;], which trades o¤ the benets of a low equilibrium price (which is
implemented by a distribution concentrated around x = 0) and the benets of being
able to the choose the better of two products (which is greater when the distribution
for x is more dispersed).21 The above discussion shows that the solution to this relaxed
problem is to choose the price p to maximize
WG   p = +
Z 0
 
Up(x)dx  p (20)
instead of (17). Since the di¤erence between (20) and (17) increases with p, the solution
to this second problem involves a higher price than in Proposition 3. However, in many
cases the di¤erence is tiny.22
Another implication of the low price in the consumer-optimal policy is that the
conditions required for the validity of ignoring the consumer participation constraint
are much less stringent than required for Lemma 1 (which was V > 3). More precisely,
we claim that if V >  then the consumer-optimal policy is as described in Proposition
3.23 To see this, note that as we have pointed out before, for consumers to do better
than the no-information policy, the industry prot  they generate cannot exceed . If
some consumers do not participate under the optimal policy, the price p must exceed
the minimum valuation V . If one rm deviates to a lower price V , it then sells to
21This relates to the policy concern about the extent to which products such as insurance should
be standardized. More standardized products are close substitutes and so facilitate competition on
price, but prevent some consumers with particular preferences from obtaining a product tailored to
those preferences. See for instance Ericson and Starc (2016) for a discussion and empirical analysis of
this issue.
22With support [ 1; 1], the price which maximizes (20) is p  0:055, compared to p =   0:052
for the example with a uniform prior.
23Note that   1
2
, and so a su¢cient condition to ignore the participation constraint is V > 1
2
.
If the prior density for x = v1   v2 is further log-concave, then F is convex on [ ; 0] and so   14,
in which a weaker su¢cient condition is V > 1
4
.
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at least half the consumers and so it obtains deviation prot at least 1
2
V . Therefore,
equilibrium industry prot  exceeds V , which is not possible when    and  < V .
Therefore, there must be full participation at the consumer-optimal policy when V > .
It follows that the price itself must be below V , in which case the outside option does
not then apply (even when one rm deviates to a higher price).
For more general prior distributions, the following result in the spirit of Roesler and
Szentes (2017) shows that we can restrict attention to a simple family of posteriors
illustrated by Figure 4c above.
Lemma 4 The consumer-optimal policy can be implemented by a symmetric posterior
dened on [ ; 0] of the form
Gmp (x) =

0 if x < m
Up(x) if m  x  0 : (21)
Proof. To see why we need only consider this family, suppose a candidate consumer-
optimal policy involves the equilibrium price p and the posterior G. For this policy to
do better than disclosing no information, it is necessary that
p 
Z 0
 
G(x)dx : (22)
Since G is below Up for x 2 [ ; 0], there is a unique m 2 [ ; 0] which satisesZ 0
 
G(x)dx =
Z 0
 
Gmp (x)dx =
p
2
log
p m
p
:
Clearly, since it crosses G once and from below in ( ; 0), this Gmp is an MPC of G
and hence of F . Expression (22) implies that m   (e2   1)p <  1
2
p. Since the lower
bound Lp becomes positive at x =  12p it follows that Gmp lies above Lp for x 2 [ ; 0].
We deduce that Gmp lies between the bounds Lp and Up, and so induces the same
equilibrium price p and has the same match e¢ciency as the original G. Therefore,
there is no posterior that does better for consumers than those which take the form
(21).
In sum, we can solve the consumer problem by choosing (p;m) to maximize consumer
surplus, +
R 0
 
Gmp (x)dx p, subject to the constraint that Gmp is an MPC of F . Using
this method one can show that it is always optimal to disclose some information to
consumers.
29
Corollary 2 Except in the degenerate case where products are perfect substitutes (i.e.,
x  0 under the prior distribution), it is sub-optimal to disclose no information to
consumers.
The welfare limits. Having discussed the signal structures which maximize prot and
which maximize consumer surplus, we are in a position to describe the combinations
of prot and consumer surplus which are feasible with some choice of symmetric signal
structure. First, it is clear that any such combination cannot sum to more than maxi-
mum welfare, which is H = +. Thus, any feasible combination lies weakly under the
e¢cient frontier marked as the higher dashed line on Figure 6 (where for convenience
we set  = 2 and  = 1
4
). Likewise, the sum cannot be lower than minimum welfare
in (9), which is  as marked as the lower dashed line on the gure, and so feasible
combinations lie between these dashed bounds. In particular, feasible combinations
cannot be too ine¢cient, and welfare cannot be further than  from the e¢cient fron-
tier. This contrasts with the corresponding gure for monopoly in Roesler and Szentes
(2017, Figure 1), where it was feasible to have low consumer surplus and low prot
simultaneously.24
0 1 2
0
1
2
consumer surplus
profit
Figure 6: Feasible combinations of prot and consumer surplus
24In Roesler and Szentes the construction for a given prot level is that the rm is indi¤erent between
all prices in the support; the lowest price is best for consumers while the highest price leaves consumers
with nothing.
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Suppose that the prior distribution has log-concave density. Then Proposition 2
shows that the maximum possible price/prot is p in (14), which in this case with
 = 1
4
is p  1:63. Any price p 2 [0; p] can be implemented, and given such a price the
range of consumer surplus which is possible is determined by the posteriors G which
lie within the bounds (13) and which are an MPC of the prior. Since the set of such
posterior distributions is convex, we merely need to determine the worst and the best
consumer surplus for a given price, as any intermediate surplus can be achieved with a
convex combination of the two extreme posteriors.
For a given price p 2 [0; p] the lowest value of consumer surplus is generated by
the lower bound Lp. This is because consumer surplus is lower with a smaller G, and
the smallest possible G given p is Lp. (Since Lp is an MPC of F by construction, so is
Lp for any lower price.) The integral of Lp(x) over [ ; 0] is 12(1   log 2)p and so the
minimum consumer surplus with price p  p is    1
2
(1 + log 2)p     0:85p. This
minimum frontier is shown as the lower bold line on Figure 6.
The precise shape of outer feasible frontier depends on the details of prior distrib-
ution, and to derive the maximum consumer surplus for a price p 2 [0; p], we need to
deal with two cases. When p  pF , the full information price, it is possible to nd a
supporting posterior G between the bounds which is an MPC of F such that (8) holds
with equality. This is because given p < p the lower bound Lp must have (8) hold with
strict inequality, while given p  pF the log-convex upper bound Up must be above the
log-concave F in the range of x < 0. One way to construct such a G is a modied
version of (21), where G(x) = Lp(x) for x < m and G(x) = Up(x) for x  m, and
where m is chosen to make (8) bind. Since there is no mismatch with such a posterior,
consumer surplus is +   p. For these prices, prot and maximum consumer surplus
sum to maximum welfare + .
When p < pF , however, we have shown that the maximum consumer surplus is
given by (17). For these lower prices, prot and maximum consumer surplus sum to
strictly less than maximum welfare due to the mismatch needed to achieve lower prices.
Proposition 3 showed that the maximum feasible consumer surplus was achieved with
a positive price. (Again, this contrasts with the gure in Roesler and Szentes, where
consumer surplus was maximized when prot was minimized.)
When the prior distribution is uniform on [ 1; 1], the higher bold curve in Figure
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6 shows the feasible outer frontier and the shaded area is the feasible combinations of
prot and consumer surplus. Here, the full-information price is pF = 1, and for prices
above pF the feasible frontier coincides with the e¢cient frontier. For lower prices, the
feasible frontier lies strictly inside the e¢cient frontier.
4.3 Asymmetric signal structures
We now extend the analysis to allow for asymmetric signal structures, such as illus-
trated on Figure 1c above, which induce rms to choose distinct prices in equilibrium.
This extension is important as, for instance, it could be possible to design consumer
information in such a way that a rm obtains higher prot than it did with the rm-
optimal symmetric signals presented in Proposition 2. This higher prot might come
either at the expense of its rival or as part of a reduction in competitive intensity due
to asymmetric rivalry between rms. It might also be possible for consumers to pre-
fer asymmetric prices: for a xed distribution over x consumer surplus is convex and
decreasing in the two rms prices, so that consumers prefer distinct prices to a uni-
form price equal to the average of the two prices. Clearly, however, maximum welfare
cannot be improved with asymmetric signals when rms are symmetric, as welfare is
maximized by ensuring consumers buy their preferred product and this requires that
prices be equal.
As with the symmetric analysis, our approach is to provide bounds on the posterior
distributions G() which induce a given pair of positive prices (p1; p2) in equilibrium.
As before, G can have no atom at x = p1  p2, and rm 2s equilibrium market share is
G(p1  p2). Since the posterior support of x must lie within [ ;], if i denotes rm
is equilibrium prot then (5) must hold. More generally, rm 2 can make no greater
prot with another price p02, so that
p02G(p1   p02)  2 :
As in section 4.2, changing variable to x = p1   p02 implies
G(x)  min

1;
2
maxf0; p1   xg

 Up1;p2(x) : (23)
(Here only the range x  p1 is relevant, for otherwise rm 2 o¤ers a negative price.)
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The parallel argument for rm 1 yields
G(x)  max

0; 1  1
maxf0; p2 + xg

 Lp1;p2(x) : (24)
Note that the lower bound Lp1;p2 is increasing in x and begins to be positive at
x = 1   p2 which exceeds   from (5). Moreover, similar as in the symmetric case,
Lp1;p2 is concave and 1  Lp1;p2 is log-convex in x whenever Lp1;p2 is greater than zero.
The upper bound Up1;p2 is increasing in x and reaches 1 at x = p1   2 which is below
 from (5). Moreover, it is log-convex (and hence convex) when it is less than 1.
Since we must have Up1;p2  Lp1;p2 to have a chance to implement these prices, and
since the bounds coincide and equal rm 2s market share when x = p1   p2, the two
functions should have the same slope at x = p1   p2, i.e., 2=p22 = 1=p21. If we write
s = 1 G(p1   p2) for rm 1s market share, so that 1=p1 = s and 2=p2 = 1  s, this
then implies
s =
p1
p1 + p2
; (25)
and
i =
p2i
p1 + p2
: (26)
In particular, equilibrium prots and market shares are determined entirely by equi-
librium prices and do not depend separately on G(x), and the rm with the higher
equilibrium price necessarily has the higher market share (and hence the higher prot).
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(b) p1 > p2
Figure 7: Asymmetric bounds on G
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In sum, as with Lemma 3 a price pair (p1; p2) can be implemented with some signal
structure if and only if a posterior G exists which is both (i) an MPC of the prior F and
(ii) lies between the bounds (23)(24), where prots are (26). Figure 7 illustrates this
discussion, where a uniform prior F is shown as the dashed line. Note that equilibrium
prices induced by a posterior G which favours rm 1 say, so that G(0)  1
2
, necessarily
satisfy p1  p2. In particular, equilibrium prices with G such that G(0) = 12 must be
symmetric.
Suppose rms are labelled so that rm 2 has the higher price (as in Figure 7a).
Since the posterior G must lie above the lower bound (24), a necessary requirement to
implement prices (p1; p2) is that this lower bound satises (8), so that
 
Z 0
1 p2

1  1
p2 + x

dx = p2   1   1 log p2
1
: (27)
(When p2  p1, the point 1   p2 where the lower bound reaches zero is negative as in
Figure 7a.) The right-hand side of (27) decreases with 1 for 1 2 [0; p2], and since 1
in (26) is lower than 1
2
p2 it follows from (27) that
1
2
p2(1   log 2)  . Since p2 is the
higher of the two prices, we deduce that it is not possible to use asymmetric signals
to implement a price for either rm which exceeds p in (14). In addition, industry
prot cannot exceed p if neither price does. When the prior has a log-concave density,
Proposition 2 implies that industry prot p can be achieved with a symmetric signal
structure, in which case we can deduce that the use of asymmetric signals cannot boost
industry prot relative to the symmetric rm-optimal policy.
More detailed analysis in the next proposition shows that even an individual rm
cannot achieve higher prot than with the rm-optimal symmetric policy, and that
consumers also can do no better with asymmetric signals.
Proposition 4 Suppose the outside option is not relevant and the prior distribution
has a log-concave density. Then relative to the optimal symmetric signal structures
in Propositions 2 and 3 the use of asymmetric signal structures cannot improve either
rms prot or aggregate consumer surplus.
Perhaps surprisingly, then, rms have congruent interests when it comes to the
design of consumer information. Intuitively, the rm which is treated unfavorably
under an asymmetric signal structure has an incentive to set a low price, and this force
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turns out to be su¢ciently powerful so that the rm which is treated favorably will
also reduce its price. Consumers also do not benet from asymmetric signals, as the
resulting mismatch outweighs the possible benet from lower prices in an asymmetric
market.
The analysis in this section is also useful for studying optimal policies when the un-
derlying market is asymmetric. For example, the bounds (23)(24) continue to apply,
as does the expression for equilibrium prot in (26). Figure 7 illustrates the bounds,
except that the prior no longer need pass through the point (0; 1
2
). However, the cal-
culation of optimal signals becomes signicantly more complicated, as the symmetric
benchmarkwhich played an important role in both the rm and consumer analysis
aboveis no longer relevant.
5 A market with an outside option
In section 3 we showed how rms earn the rst-best prot with the rank signal structure
when consumer valuations were su¢ciently dispersed, in which case the participation
constraint for all consumers was binding. By contrast, section 4 studied the situation
where valuations were su¢ciently concentrated, in which case the participation con-
straint was irrelevant and second-best policies could be derived since only the (scalar)
valuation di¤erence x = v1   v2 mattered. In this section we bridge the gap between
these two situations by considering a case where consumer heterogeneity is actually
one-dimensional.
There are a number of demand specications where there is scalar heterogeneity.
For instance, we could suppose that the valuation for one of the products is accurately
known ex ante, while information about a second product (perhaps a new product)
might be manipulated. This is a special case of the general setup when consumers are
distributed on a vertical or horizontal segment in the valuation space. In this section,
however, we maintain the assumption that products are symmetric and suppose that
average valuations are the same for all consumers while there is uncertainty about
relative preferences, as in a Hotelling-style market. This is a special case of the general
setup when consumers are distributed on a diagonal segment of the form v1 + v2 =
constant in valuation space. More precisely, suppose a consumer values product 1 at
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v1 = 1 +
1
2
x and product 2 at v2 = 1  12x, where x = v1   v2 2 [ ;] indicates her
relative preference for product 1 and each consumers average valuation 1
2
(v1 + v2)  1
is constant. Assume   2 so that all consumers value both products. The prior
distribution for x 2 [ ;] is symmetric about zero and has CDF F (x). For simplicity,
in this section we focus on symmetric signal structures which induce a pure strategy
pricing equilibrium.
We rst show that even if the outside option binds, all consumers purchase in the
rm-optimal or consumer-optimal solution.
Lemma 5 A rm-optimal or consumer-optimal symmetric signal structure induces an
equilibrium with full market coverage.
The argument for the consumer-optimal policy is simple. A consumer-optimal signal
structure must be weakly better for consumers than no information disclosure, where
consumers buy a random product at price zero and so consumer surplus is 1. Since
the match e¢ciency improvement relative to random match is at most  (which has
the same denition as in (6)), rms cannot earn more than  in the consumer-optimal
solution, where   
2
 1 given   2. Suppose in contrast to the claim that
the market is fully covered that some consumers do not buy, in which case the price
must exceed 1 and consumers around x = 0 are excluded. Then a feasible unilateral
deviation is to charge at 1, in which case at least half of the consumers will buy from
the deviating rm. Hence, each rms equilibrium prot must be greater than 1
2
, and so
industry prot exceeds 1 which is a contradiction. The argument for the rm-optimal
policy is less straightforward, and we provide the details in the appendix.
When the market is fully covered in equilibrium, the previous bounds analysis can
be extended to the situation where the outside option may be relevant. The major
di¤erence is that to implement a price p > 1 in a symmetric equilibrium, which con-
sumers near x = 0 would be unwilling to pay, the posterior distribution should have no
consumers near x = 0. (The details are provided in the appendix.) Using the adjusted
bounds, a similar analysis as in section 4.2 can be done. The consumer-optimal price is
low so that the presence of the outside option has little impact on the consumer-optimal
policy, as we discuss in the appendix. In the following we focus on how the outside
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option might a¤ect the rm-optimal solution.25
Proposition 5 When the prior distribution has a log-concave density, the rm-optimal
solution involves no mismatch, and is as follows:
(i) when   1
2
(1   log 2), the rm-optimal price is p in (14), which satises p  1,
and is uniquely implemented by Lp;
(ii) when 1
2
(1 log 2) <  < 1
3
, the rm-optimal price p 2 (1; 4
3
) solves p
2
[1+log(4
p
 2)] =
1   and is uniquely implemented by a modied posterior lower bound;
(iii) when   1
3
, i.e., when (4) holds, the rm-optimal price is p = H = 1 +  which
earns rms the rst-best prot and is implemented by the rank signal structure.
Intuitively, if the prior distribution is su¢ciently concentrated (in the sense that 
is small), the rm-optimal price must be low so that the outside option is irrelevant
and the solution is the same as in Proposition 2. In contrast, if the prior distribution
is su¢ciently dispersed that (4) holds the rst-best outcome is achievable. In between,
the optimal solution is a mixture of these two cases, and it changes smoothly with .
In all the three cases, there is no product mismatch and so total welfare is maximized
as well.
To illustrate, consider the uniform example with support [ ;] and  = 
4
. When
  2(1   log 2)  0:61, case (i) in Proposition 5 applies and the optimal G has
a U-shaped density similar to Figure 1b before. When 2(1   log 2)    4
3
, case
(ii) applies and the optimal G is as described in Figure 8 in the case  = 1 (where
p  1:235). The distribution has two symmetric mass points (represented as the dots
on the density gure) and no consumers located between them. When  is larger, the
optimal distribution has more weight on the two mass points, and as  approaches 4
3
it converges to a binary distribution on f 
2
; 
2
g which is implemented by the rank
structure and earns rms the rst-best prot.
25As in section 4.2, the analysis can also be extended to the case with a more general prior.
37
-1 0 1
0
1
2
3
x
density
-1 0 1
0.0
0.5
1.0
x
CDF
Figure 8: Firm-optimal G when  = 1
6 Allowing mixed pricing strategies
It is hard to deal systematically with signal structures which induce mixed strategy
pricing equilibrium, when the bounds in section 4 does not apply. Instead, in this
section we derive an upper bound for consumer surplus across all symmetric signal
structures which induce a symmetric (pure or mixed) strategy equilibrium, and when
the prior distribution is regular this upper bound is close to the maximum consumer
surplus available with pure strategies. Intuitively, mixed strategy pricing usually does
not intensify price competition and the resulting price dispersion further causes product
mismatch, in which case it does not benet consumers.
Consider the model introduced in section 2, where F denotes the symmetric prior
distribution of x = v1 v2 and G denotes a symmetric posterior distribution. Consumer
surplus under G is no greater than WG =  +
R 0
 
G(x)dx minus industry prot in a
symmetric equilibrium with posterior G. We rst derive a lower bound on that industry
prot:
Lemma 6 Suppose V   and let G be a symmetric distribution for x = v1 v2. Then
in any symmetric equilibrium (with pure or mixed strategies) industry prot is no lower
than
max
x2[ ;]
:
 2xG(x)
1 G(x) : (28)
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Proof. Note that (28) is zero if and only if the distribution G has x  0, in
which case equilibrium prot is also zero and the result holds. Suppose now that (28)
is positive, and (slightly abusing notation) denote its value by p > 0. Since x which
solves (28) must be negative, we have p  2. Suppose in contrast that there is an
equilibrium where each rm obtains prot  strictly below p=2. Firm 1, say, will never
choose a price below  in this equilibrium (as then it obtains lower prot even if it
serves all consumers). Firm 2s prot  is then at least equal to the maximum prot
it can obtain if rm 1 chooses price . Given  < p=2    V , if rm 1 chooses
price  the outside option is not relevant for consumers, regardless of the price chosen
by rm 2. Hence rm 2s prot  satises
  max
p0
: p0  Prfv2   p0  v1   g = max
p0
: p0G(   p0) = max
x2[ ;]
: (   x)G(x) ;
where the nal equality follows after changing to the variable x =    p0. Thus for
any x 2 [ ;] we have (1 G(x))   xG(x), in which case  is at least equal to
p=2. As this contradicts our assumption, the result is proved.
Slightly abusing the notation let p denote (28) for a given G. (The proof of Lemma
6 shows that p  2.) Then an upper bound on consumer surplus with posterior G
is WG   p. By construction, for any x 2 [ ; 0) we have G(x)=(1   G(x))  p 2x , or
G(x)  p
p 2x
. (If the lower bound p is attained, then G should equal p
p 2x
for some
x < 0.) Since G cannot exceed 1
2
for x 2 [ ; 0], it follows that G in the negative range
lies below the upper bound
G(x)  U^p(x)  min

1
2
;
p
p  2x

: (29)
(Here, the upper bound U^p increases with p and x, and reaches
1
2
at x =  1
2
p 
 .) Without considering the prior, an upper bound on consumers surplus is then
 + maxp(WU^p   p), which is similar to the relaxed problem in (20). Note that U^p
lies above the upper bound Up in (11), which was relevant with the restriction to pure
strategies and which for negative x equals p=(2p  2x). However, for small p, which is
usually the relevant case, the two bounds are very close and for this reason the use of
mixed strategies cannot signicantly benet consumers.
Considering the MPC constraint from the prior distribution can tighten the con-
sumer surplus upper bound. Given the prior distribution F , let  p denote the maximum
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match e¢ciency when the lower bound on industry prot is p, i.e.,  p =: maxG
R 0
 
G(x)dx
subject to (i) G lying below the upper bound U^p(x) in (29) (and touching it at some
x < 0) and (ii) G being a symmetric MPC of F . Therefore, an upper bound on
consumer surplus is +maxp( p   p).
The remaining task is to calculate  p, and this can be done in a manner similar to
the way we found the consumer-optimal policy for a given price with pure strategies
in section 4.2. If the prior has a log-concave density, then F is log-concave on [ ; 0],
while the upper bound U^p is log-convex in the range [ ; 12p]. For relatively small
p, which will be the relevant case, the upper bound U^p therefore crosses the prior F
twice.26 See Figure 9 for an illustration when the prior is uniform.
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Figure 9: Consumer-optimal way to reach the prot lower bound p
Using this adjusted upper bound on the feasible posterior G, the following result
demonstrates that, in regular cases, it is not possible that consumers can do signicantly
better if the class of signal structures is broadened to permit mixed pricing strategies
in equilibrium. (Note, however, we have not found an example where the use of mixed
strategies improves consumer surplus at all.)
26To see that with the p which maximizes ^p   p the upper bound U^p crosses the prior F , we argue
as follows. For any p we must have ^p   since G is an MPC of F . Let ~p denote the price such that
U^~p just touches F . Then setting G  F solves the stated problem for ^ ~p, in which case ^ ~p = . For
p > ~p, when the upper bound U^p lies strictly above F , we must have ^p   p     p < ^ ~p   ~p. As
claimed, then, the p which maximizes ^p   p is no greater than ~p and so the upper bound crosses F .
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Proposition 6 Suppose V   and x = v1   v2 has a log-concave density. Then the
maximum consumer surplus available using only pure strategies attains at least 98.4% of
the maximum consumer surplus available across all symmetric signal structures which
induce a symmetric pure or mixed strategy equilibrium.
Ideally we would like to obtain a tight upper bound on prot as well, and see how
close the optimal prot under the pure strategy restriction is relative to such an upper
bound. This appears to be a harder problem, though, and we leave it for future work.27
7 Conclusion
This paper has studied the limits to competition when product information possessed by
consumers can be designed exibly. Among signal structures which induce pure strategy
pricing equilibrium, we derived the optimal policy for rms and for consumers. The
rm-optimal signal structure amplies perceived product di¤erentiation by reducing
the number of consumers who regard the products as close substitutes. The rm-
optimal signal structure typically enables consumers to buy their preferred product,
and so it maximizes total welfare as well. In particular, the rank information structure
which only informs consumers of which product is a better match can sometimes be
optimal for rms. The consumer-optimal policy, in contrast, dampens perceived product
di¤erentiation by increasing the number of marginal consumers and so implements a low
price. This low price can only be achieved by inducing a degree of product mismatch,
however, and so the policy does not maximize welfare.
One interesting extension to this analysis would be to consider situations where
rms were asymmetric ex ante, including the case of vertical di¤erentiation where one
rm was known to provide a higher match utility than its rival. One could investigate
whether the optimal information policy maintains, amplies or reduces this prior asym-
metry, and whether rms continue to have aligned interests over the design of consumer
information.
27Under the rank signal structure, following Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) one can characterize a
symmetric mixed strategy pricing equilibrium when (3) does not hold. The resulting prot is lower
than the optimal prot derived in section 4.2 under the pure strategy restriction if the prior density is
log-concave. However, the opposite can be true for an irregular prior when there is no pure strategy
equilibrium with full information (e.g., when x is binary on f ;g).
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Another, more ambitious, extension would be to investigate how the number of
rivals a¤ects optimal information design. With just two rms, consumers face a trade
o¤ between low prices and the ability to choose the better product, and often this trade
o¤ was resolved by revealing little product information to consumers. Withmany rms,
however, this trade-o¤ usually vanishes: with full information disclosure, consumers in
such a market can choose their preferred product and usually pay a price close to
marginal cost, and so this policy achieves the rst best for consumers. Of course, the
need to choose among many products may bring its own information processing costs
for consumers. If this is a concern, a modied version of the rank signal structure can
also approximate the rst best outcome for consumers: if consumers are informed which
are their best two products (but without ranking them) then there will be marginal-cost
pricing, and with many rms there will be a negligible sacrice of match quality.
Full analysis of markets with more than two rms would require consideration of
multi-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, however, rather than the scalar analysis in
this paper, even in situations where the outside option could be ignored. Nevertheless,
some preliminary observations about the n-rm case are that the signal structure which
informs consumers of their most preferred product but nothing else can sometimes
enable rms to achieve the rst-best outcome under a suitably modied version of
(3), and even if it does not achieve rst-best prot, the same signal structure bounds
industry prot away from zero regardless of the number of rms. This contrasts with
the literature discussed in the introduction, where rms disclose only information about
their own product, where rms disclose all information and price is close to marginal
cost when there are many rms.
A third extension would be to allow consumers to be heterogeneous ex ante. For
instance, a consumers valuation vi for product i might be decomposed as vi = ai + bi,
where consumers know the vector (a1; :::) from the start, from other information sources,
and there is scope to manipulate information about the vector (b1; :::). If there was
enough heterogeneity in (a1; :::) then one may be able to rule out mixed pricing strategies
in equilibrium, rather than assuming them away as we mostly did in this paper.
Finally, it would be valuable to embed this analysis within a framework in which the
information designer is modelled explicitly. Platforms typically compete with each
other to provide intermediation services. If a prot-maximizing platform chooses what
42
product information to reveal to consumers, and also chooses its fees to each side of the
market, then the relative competitive intensity among platforms on the two sides of the
market and the platforms equilibrium fee structure will presumably a¤ect whether its
information policy is focussed more on delivering rm prot or consumer surplus.
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Technical Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1. Let H(vi) be the CDF for each valuation, with weakly decreasing
density h(vi). Then the CDF for the variable maxfv1; v2g is H2(v), and so from (2)
3    =
Z 
0
f3[1 H2(v)]  4[1 H(v)]gdv
=
Z 
0
f[1 H(v)][3H(v)  1]gdv
=
Z 1
0
(1  z)(3z   1)
h(H 1(z))
dz :
Here, the nal equality follows by changing variables from v to z = H(v), and H 1()
is the inverse function to H(). Noting that the above integrand is negative for z < 1
3
and positive for z > 1
3
, and that h(H 1(z)) weakly decreases with z, it follows that
3     1
h(H 1(1
3
))
Z 1
0
[(1  z)(3z   1)]dz = 0
as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 2. To show the upper bound, note f being symmetric and log-concave
on [ ;] implies the density is single peaked so that F is convex for x  0. In this
case
 =
Z 0
 
F (x)dx 
Z 0
 1
2f(0)
(1
2
+ xf(0))dx =
1
8f(0)
= 1
4
pF ;
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where the inequality follows since F lies above its tangent at x = 0 in the range x  0.
To show the lower bound, note that
1
2
=
Z 0
 
f(x)dx =
Z 0
 
f(x)
F (x)
F (x)dx  f(0)
F (0)
Z 0
 
F (x)dx = 2f(0) =

pF
;
where the inequality follows from F being log-concave (which in turn follows from f
being log-concave). 
Proof of Proposition 3. With a log-concave density F is log-concave on [ ; 0]. Since
Up is log-convex, it follows that for each price below the full information price pF the
upper bound Up crosses the prior CDF once and from above in the range [ ; 0].28
Then the same argument as used for the uniform prior shows that an optimal G given
p  pF is given by (16).
WithG in (16), the derivative of consumer surplus with respect to price is (18). Since
F (xp)  Up(xp) it follows that pp xp = 2F (xp), and substituting this into (18) shows the
derivative of consumer surplus with respect to price to be 1
2
(2F (xp)  log(2F (xp))  3).
Note that the intercept point xp increases with p given that the upper bound crosses
F from above. The above derivative therefore decreases with p, and so the optimal
intercept point x satises 2F (x) = , or x = F 1(1
2
). The optimal price p then
satises p

p x
= 2F (x) = , from which we obtain p =  
1 
x and so (19). For
reference later, note that optimal consumer surplus is
+
Z x
 
F (x)dx+
Z 0
x
Up(x)dx  p = +
Z x
 
F (x)dx  p

1 + 1
2
log
p
p   x

= +
Z x
 
F (x)dx  xF (x)
=  
Z x
 
xdF (x) : (30)
(Here, the second equality used p

p x
= 2F (x) = , the denition of , and (19), while
the last equality follows by integration by parts.)
The fraction of consumers sure to choose their preferred product, which is 2F (x),
is equal to  regardless of the prior (provided it has log-concave density). Given a
28We also need to check that G in (16) is above the lower bound Lp for prices below pF , which is
ensured if F is above Lp or 1 F is below 1 Lp. However, since 1 Lp is log-convex, this is the case
for all p  pF when 1  F is log-concave.
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log-concave density F is convex in the range [ ; 0], and so 
2
= F (x)  1
2
+xf(0) =
1
2
(1 + x

pF
), or  x

pF
 1  . Using (19), this implies that p  pF as claimed. 
Proof of Corollary 2. It su¢ces to nd a signal structure which is strictly better for
consumers than no information disclosure. Consider Gmp dened in (21) wherem   p
as p varies and  > e2   1 is a constant . Since F is not degenerate at x = 0, Gmp is
an MPC of F when p > 0 is su¢ciently small. (Since m <  1
2
p we have Gmp  Lp.)
Consumer surplus with this policy is
+
Z 0
 
Gmp (x)dx  p = +
Z 0
 p
Up(x)dx  p = + 12p[log(1 + )  2] :
The term [] is positive by assumption, and so this policy is better for consumers than
no information disclosure (since the latter corresponds to p = 0). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose rms are labelled so p2  p1, in which case 2  1
and (27) must be satised. If r = 2=1  1 denotes the prot ratio, then (27) can be
written as
  2

p2
2
  1
r
  1
r
log
p2
1

= 2

1 +
1p
r
  1
r
  1
r
log(r +
p
r)

;
where the equality follows after inverting the pair of equations (26) to obtain p2 =
2 +
p
12. The term [] is equal to 1   log 2 when r = 1 and is strictly greater than
1  log 2 for r > 1. (This can be veried by using the concavity of log() to show that
log(r +
p
r)  log 2 + 1
2
(r +
p
r   2).) It follows that 2 cannot exceed 12p, and hence
that neither rms prot can exceed the symmetric rm-optimal prot in Proposition
2.
Turning to the consumer problem, let p1 and p2 be the equilibrium prices induced
with some signal structure. Similarly to (9), consumer surplus with these prices is
E[maxfv1   p1; v2   p2g] =   p1 +
Z p1 p2
 
G(x)dx : (31)
Suppose asymmetric prices are implemented, and now suppose rms are labelled so
p1 > p2 as in Figure 7b. As on that gure, the upper bound satises Up1;p2(x) <
1
2
for
x  p1   p2. Since the upper bound is log-convex and the prior F is log-concave given
its density is log-concave, the upper bound must cross F once and from above in the
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range [ ; p1  p2]. Let x^ < 0 denote this intercept point. Then a similar argument to
that which led to (17) shows that consumer surplus in (31) can be no greater than
  p1 +
Z p1 p2
 
minfF (x); Up1;p2(x)gdx : (32)
Consider changing prices to a symmetric price pair p1 = p2 = p such that the new
upper bound crosses F at the same point x^. This implies that p satises
2
p1   x^ =
1
2
p
p  x^ ;
or
p =
 x^2
1
2
(p1   x^)  2
< 22 < p2 :
Here, the rst inequality follows since 2 <
1
2
p1 and the second inequality follows since
2 <
1
2
p2. Therefore, this uniform price is lower than p2 and hence also lower than p1.
The di¤erence between expression (32) with the uniform price p and with original
prices (p1; p2) is
p1   p+
Z 0
x^
1
2
p
p  xdx 
Z p1 p2
x^
2
p1   xdx : (33)
Note that the rst integrand, 1
2
p=(p x), is greater than the second, 2=(p1 x), in the
range x^  x  0. (This is because there is equality by construction in the two terms
when x = x^, and (p   x)=(p1   x) decreases with x given that p < p1.) Since we also
have p < p2, it follows that (33) is greater than
p1   p2  
Z p1 p2
0
2
p1   xdx > 0
where the inequality holds since the integrand (i.e., the upper bound) is less than 1.
We deduce that starting from any distinct prices (p1; p2), the upper bound on con-
sumer surplus (32) increases if we instead implement this uniform price p. Since this
upper bound is achieved with symmetric prices (given the log-concavity assumption),
we see that consumer surplus cannot be increased by using asymmetric signals and
prices. 
The bounds analysis for Section 5. Here we rst extend the posterior bounds analysis
to the setup in section 5 when the market is fully covered in a symmetric equilibrium
with price p. (This analysis will also be used to prove the full-coverage result in Lemma
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5.) Consider a symmetric equilibrium price p, and suppose rm 2 deviates to p0. A
type-x consumer will buy from rm 2 if and only if 1  x
2
  p0  maxf0; 1+ x
2
  pg, i.e.,
if x  minf2(1  p0); p  p0g. Hence, p is a full-coverage equilibrium price if and only if
p0G(minf2(1  p0); p  p0g)  1
2
p (34)
holds for any p0 and with equality at p0 = p. To implement a price p  1   
2
(which
is the lowest valuation for a product), the extensive margin 2(1   p0) does not matter
and the bounds are (13) as before. To implement a higher price p > 1  
2
, we need to
deal with the extensive margin explicitly. Note that if p > 1 then any consumers with
posterior x  0 will not participate. However, as with the rank signal, the signal could
induce a gap in the posterior distribution around x = 0, in which case it is possible to
have full coverage with a price p > 1.
For convenience, dene
UMp (x) = min

1;
p
maxf0; 2  xg

; Up(x) = min

1;
p
2maxf0; p  xg

: (35)
Here, Up(x) is the same upper bound as before, and U
M
p (x) is the upper bound when the
outside option binds. Notice that UMp and Up intersect only once at ~xp and U
M
p > Up
if and only if x < ~xp. (Note that ~xp   given p never exceeds 1 + 2 , the highest
valuation for a product.) Using this notation, condition (34) can be written as
G(x)  maxfUMp (x); Up(x)g
and
G(minf ~xp; 0g) = 12 : (36)
The qualitative form of the bounds depend on the size of p as shown in Figure 10
below. (Recall that when G is symmetric, the lower bound is the mirror image of the
upper bound.) For price 1   
2
< p  1, we have ~xp 2 ( ; 0] so the upper bound
takes the form of UMp for x < ~xp as illustrated in Figure 10a. The upper bound passes
through the point (0; 1
2
), and the bounds conditions imply (36) which is now G(0) = 1
2
.
In particular, the lower bound in the range x 2 [ ; 0] is unchanged from (13). For
a price 1 < p < 4
3
, the bounds are shown in Figure 10b. We have ~xp 2 (0; p2) where
p
2
is the value of x where Up reaches 1. The crucial di¤erence is that now (36) implies
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G( ~xp) = 12 . This requires G(x) = 12 for x 2 [ ~xp; ~xp], and so in this middle range
there are no consumers and the upper bound and the lower bound coincide. Finally,
for price p  4
3
, we have ~xp >
p
2
and the middle range is so large that the bounds are
as shown in Figure 10c. In particular, the lower bound for negative x is a step function
with discontinuity at  ~xp.
-1 0 1
0.0
0.5
1.0
x
(a) 1  
2
< p  1
-1 0 1
0.0
0.5
1.0
x
(b) 1 < p < 4
3
-1 0 1
0.0
0.5
1.0
x
(c) p  4
3
Figure 10: Bounds on G to implement price p > 1  
2
Proof of Lemma 5. Here we prove that the market is fully covered in the rm-optimal
solution. It su¢ces to show that for any signal structure which induces a partial-
coverage equilibrium, there exists another signal structure which induces a full-coverage
equilibrium with a strictly higher industry prot.
Consider a symmetric posterior distribution G which is an MPC of F and induces
an equilibrium where each rm charges p > 1 and only a fraction  < 1 of consumers
buy. (If p  1 all consumers would buy in equilibrium.) Notice that ~xp  2(p  1) > 0
solves 1+ x
2
= p, so consumers with x  ~xp buy from rm 1 and those with x   ~xp buy
from rm 2. Other consumers in the range of ( ~xp; ~xp) are excluded from the market.
Industry prot in this equilibrium must be no less than one, i.e., p  1, since each
rm could attract half the consumers by charging price 1.
Suppose rm 1 charges the equilibrium price p but rm 2 deviates to p0. A consumer
of type x will buy from rm 2 if and only if 1   x
2
  p0  maxf0; 1 + x
2
  pg. This
requires x  minf2(1  p0); p  p0g. The no-deviation condition for the partial-coverage
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equilibrium is then p0G(minf2(1 p0); p p0g)  1
2
p for any p0, with equality at p0 = p.
Changing variables yields
G(x)  maxfUMp (x); Up(x)g and G( ~xp) =

2
;
where UMp and Up are given in (35). Here, U
M
p > Up if and only if x < ~xp. The upper
bound passes through the point ( ~xp; 2 ). For our purpose, we only need the lower
bound which is the mirror image of the upper bound:
L;p(x) =

1  Up( x) if x <  ~xp
maxf
2
; 1  UMp ( x)g if   ~xp  x < 0 :
In the following, we will use
L ;p(x) =

1  Up( x) if x <  ~xp

2
if   ~xp  x < 0 (38)
which is weakly lower than L;p(x).
Let p^ = p  1 and construct a new symmetric posterior which is equal to
L1;p^(x) =

1  Up^( x) if x <  ~xp^
1
2
if   ~xp^  x < 0 (39)
in the range of negative x. Note that this is the lower bound of posteriors which support
a full-coverage equilibrium with price p^  1. In the following, we show that L1;p^ is a
strict MPC of G in the sense of
R u
 
L1;p^(x)dx <
R u
 
G(x)dx for any u 2 ( ; 0].
(Then a similar posterior associated with a price slightly above p^ must be an MPC of
G.) Since L ;p  G, it su¢ces to show L1;p^ is a strict MPC of L ;p. One can check
that L1;p^ crosses L
 
;p only once and from below in the range of negative x. Therefore,
it su¢ces to show Z 0
 
L1;p^(x)dx <
Z 0
 
L ;p(x)dx :
Using (38) and (39), one can rewrite this condition as
1  1
2
p

1 + log

4
p
  2

< (2  )(1  1
2
p)  1
2
p log

4
p
  2


;
which further simplies to
p log 2  p
2  p < 2(  1)(p  1) :
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Given log x  x  1, a su¢cient condition for the above inequality is
p
2  p >
2(p  1)
p
:
Since p  1, we have p
2 p
 1. Therefore, the above condition holds if 1 > 2(p 1)
p
or
p < 2. This must be true given p < 1 + 
2
and   2. This completes the proof. 
Omitted details of the consumer-optimal solution in Section 5. The consumer-optimal
policy is less a¤ected by the presence of the outside option. As mentioned in the main
text, the consumer-optimal price is no greater than . When the prior density is log-
concave, we have   
4
, and so if   4
3
the consumer-optimal price is no greater
than 1  
2
(which is the minimum valuation for a product in our setup), in which case
Proposition 3 continues to apply. For larger , we have   1
2
given   2, so we can
focus on price p  1
2
. For such a low price, the relevant posterior upper bound in the
range x 2 [ ; 0] is
~Up(x) = maxfUMp (x); Up(x)g ;
where UMp is introduced in (35). Notice that ~Up is log-convex, and F is log-concave in
the range of x  0 if its density is log-concave, and since p <   1
2
pF the upper bound
~Up crosses F only once and from above. Therefore, the same analysis of the consumer
problem in section 4.2 applies here, after replacing the upper bound Up there by ~Up.
To illustrate, consider the uniform example with support [ ;]. One can check
that F (~xp)  Up(~xp) if p  2   , where recall ~xp = 2(p   1) is where UMp and Up
intersect. In this price range, UMp becomes irrelevant and the intercept point of F and
~Up in the range of negative x is the same as in section 4.2. Following the analysis
there, the consumer-optimal price is p = , where recall   0:05 is the solution to
   log  = 3. This is indeed less than 2    if   2
1+
 1:9. When p > 2   ,
the intercept point of F and ~Up solves F (x) = U
M
p (x), from which it follows that
xp =
1
2
[2  
p
(2 )2   8(p  1)]. In this case, (18) becomes
Z 0
xp
@ ~Up(x)
@p
dx  1 = log 2  xp
2  xp +
1
2

p
p  xp   log
p
p  xp   3

:
This is positive at p = 2  if  > 2
1+
and must be negative at p = 1. For instance,
when  = 2, the consumer-optimal price is p  0:105, but this is almost the same as
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. In other words, even in this case with large  the outside option has a negligible
e¤ect on the consumer-optimal policy.
Proof of Proposition 5. The lower bound for x 2 [ ; 0] across the three cases depicted
in Figure 10 can be succinctly dened as
~Lp(x) =

Lp(x) if x < minf0; ~xpg
1
2
if minf0; ~xpg  x < 0 ;
and it increases with p. When the prior density is log-concave the prior CDF F is
convex with F ( ) = 0. Therefore, ~Lp crosses F at most once and from below in the
range of negative x. This implies that the optimal posterior must take the form of the
lower bound, and the optimal price p solvesZ 0
 
~Lp(x)dx =  : (40)
(This implies there is no mismatch with the rm-optimal signal structure.) We then
have: (i) if   R 0
 
~L1(x)dx =
1
2
(1  log 2), (40) has a unique solution p = 2
1 log 2
 1
and ~Lp takes the form in Figure 10a; (ii) if
1
2
(1  log 2) <  < R 0
 
~L4=3(x)dx =
1
3
, (40)
has a unique solution p 2 (1; 4
3
) which solvesZ 0
 
~Lp(x)dx = 1  p2 [1 + log(4p   2)] =  ;
and ~Lp takes the form in Figure 10b; (iii) if   13 , which implies (4), (40) has a unique
solution p = 1 +  and ~Lp takes the form in Figure 10c. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let x^p denote the smaller of the two crossing points given p
illustrated on Figure 9 (i.e. the smaller solution to p
p 2x
= F (x)). As in section 4.2, two
necessary conditions for G are that it satisfy the MPC constraint (7) at the intercept
point x^p, and that G lies below U^p for x 2 [x^p; 0]. The bold curve on Figure 9 shows a
convenient way to do this. Note that unlike with Figure 4b above, we have not shown
that this G is an MPC of F , as U^p is above F for x close to zero. Therefore, the resulting
^ p is an upper bound on the feasible match e¢ciency when the MPC constraint is fully
considered.
As with expression (17), an upper bound on consumer surplus given p is therefore
+
Z x^p
 
F (x)dx+
Z 0
x^p
U^p(x)dx  p : (41)
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The derivative of this expression with respect to p is
Z
 
1
2
p
x^p
@U^p(x)
@p
dx  1 = 1
2

p
p  2x^p   log
2p
p  2x^p  
5
2

:
It equals 1
2
(F (x^p)   log(2F (x^p))   52) by using pp 2x^p = F (x^p). Note that x^p increases
with p given that U^p crosses F from above at the smaller of the two crossing points.
This derivative therefore decreases with p, and so the point x^ which maximizes the
upper bound (41) satises F (x^) = ^, where ^  0:043 is the root of    log(2) = 5
2
.
Evaluating the upper bound (41) at this crossing point x^ shows the maximum consumer
surplus upper bound to be
+
Z x^
 
F (x)dx  x^F (x^) =  
Z x^
 
xdF (x) ; (42)
which is the same expression as (30) in the consumer-optimal problem in section 4.2
but using x^ > x rather than x.
Finally, we show that consumer surplus with pure strategies comes close to reaching
this upper bound. The ratio of consumer surplus with pure strategies to this upper
bound is
  R x
 
xdF (x)
  R x^
 
xdF (x)
=
  xF (x) + R x
 
F (x)dx
  x^F (x^) + R x^
 
F (x)dx
>
  xF (x) + R x
 
F (x)dx
  xF (x^) + R x
 
F (x)dx
>
  xF (x)
  xF (x^) >
+F (x)
+F (x^)
 +F (x
)
 +F (x^)
=
1 + F (x)
1 + F (x^)
=
1 + 1
2

1 + ^
 0:984 :
Here, the rst inequality uses
R x^
x
F (x)dx < (x^   x)F (x^), the third inequality uses
  < x < 0, and the nal inequality uses the fact that V   implies   . Thus,
when the prior has log-concave density the maximum consumer surplus attainable with
pure strategies attains at least 98.4% of the consumer surplus which could be available
when mixed pricing strategies were permitted. 
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